Tjia v. Atty Gen USA by unknown
2006 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-20-2006 
Tjia v. Atty Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006 
Recommended Citation 
"Tjia v. Atty Gen USA" (2006). 2006 Decisions. 1410. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/1410 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2006 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
NO. 05-2356
                    
 BUDI WERIANTO TJIA,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES;
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
Respondents
                    
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
No. A78-727-250
Immigration Judge:  Hon. Donald Vincent Ferlise
                   
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 8, 2006
BEFORE:  AMBRO and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges,
and STAGG,* District Judge
(Opinion Filed:   March 20, 2006)
                    
                                                 
* Hon. Tom Stagg, Senior United States District Judge for the Western District of
Louisiana, sitting by designation.
2                    
OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Budi Werianto Tjia is a citizen of Indonesia who seeks review of an
order requiring his removal and denying his applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.  Tjia claims to have been
persecuted in Indonesia in the past, and to fear persecution there in the future, because he
is Christian and of Chinese ethnic descent.  We will deny the petition for review.
In Fatin v. INS, we defined “persecution” as “threats to life, confinement, torture,
and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.”  12
F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993).  “Violence or other harm perpetrated by civilians . . .
does not constitute persecution unless such acts are “committed by the government or
forces the government is either ‘unable or unwilling’ to control.”  Lie v. Ashcroft, 396
F.3d 530 (3d Cir. 2005), quoting from Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 (3d.
Cir. 2003).  And, of course, an asylum applicant must show that the claimed persecution
was “on account of” one of the five enumerated grounds:  race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  
With respect to past persecution, the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) opinion in this
3matter addressed each of the incidents that Tjia described in his testimony and claimed to
constitute persecution.  In each instance, the IJ concluded, with record support, that the
incident did not constitute persecution, the evidence did not show that the threat or harm
was in any way connected with Tjia’s ethnicity or religion, and/or that nothing indicated
that the threat or harm came from the government or a source that the government was
unwilling or unable to control.  The BIA agreed.  So do we.
With respect to fear of future persecution, the BIA noted that Tjia “did not testify
to individualized threats that would form a basis for a well founded fear of persecution”
and that he had not established a “pattern or practice” of government sponsored
persecution of Chinese Christians in Indonesia.  Our review of the record confirms the
accuracy of these observations.  On a similar record, we recently concluded in Lie v.
Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530 (3d Cir. 2005), that the activity alleged to constitute a pattern and
practice of persecution of ethnic Chinese Christians in Indonesia was not “systemic,
pervasive, or organized,” and, accordingly, not a “pattern or practice.”  Id. at 537.  Our
description of the record there is equally applicable here:
Petitioners argue, with some force, that anti-Chinese violence
persists, citing evidence in the record of widespread attacks on Chinese
Christians in Indonesia, including press accounts of riots, vandalism, and
robbery targeting Chinese Christians.  Nevertheless, such violence does not
appear to be sufficiently widespread as to constitute a pattern or practice. 
The 1999 Country Report on Indonesia indicated that there was a sharp
decline in violence against Chinese Christians following the period of
intense violence in 1998, and noted that the Indonesian government
officially promotes religious and ethnic tolerance.  Moreover, this violence
seems to have been primarily wrought by fellow citizens and not the result
of governmental action or acquiescence.  Given these considerations, we are
4not compelled to find that such attacks constitute a pattern or practice of
persecution against Chinese Christians.  
Id. at 537-38 (footnote omitted).
Finally, we agree with the BIA that, while the IJ made some comments that were
“unusually informal and blunt,” the record provides assurance that Tjia was provided with
a fair opportunity to present his case and received an objective evaluation thereof. 
Accordingly, we perceive no Due Process violation.  Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S.
540, 555 (1994).
The petition for review will be denied.
